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Overdrafting Toward Disaster: A Call for
Local Groundwater Management
Reform in California’s Central Valley
By PHILIP LAIRD*
Introduction
MY GRANDFATHER has been a farmer all of his life. He has grown
raisins in Selma, California for over seventy years. Like most crops,
raisins need good soil, sunshine, and a steady flow of water. Without
any one of these elements, the vines will die, and the crop will be a
loss. Water, as one can imagine, ends up being the most problematic
resource. There are no rivers or canals that run by my grandfather’s
property. Thus in order to nourish his vineyard and make the vines
grow, he has to pump groundwater. My grandfather first began using
his pump in the 1930s. At that time, the well he used only had to
extend down eighteen feet to reach the water table and provide suffi-
cient water to his ranch. As the years went by though, the water table
dropped, and he had to spend more and more money digging deeper
wells and pumping from greater depths. Today, in order to reach the
water table, my grandfather’s well is ninety feet deep.
This story is not unique to my grandfather. The water table
throughout California is dropping at an alarming rate, and thus far,
efforts to seriously curb this depletion are minimal at best. Currently,
groundwater in California provides approximately 30% of the state’s
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water supply in an average year, and up to 40% in a dry year;1 ground-
water pumping, however, still remains largely unregulated.2 A number
of factors have contributed to the lack of groundwater management in
California, but the fact remains that the continued overdraft of the
resource will inevitably lead to its disappearance.3
Some of the most severe overdrafting is occurring in California’s
Central Valley.4 The Central Valley is home to one of the world’s larg-
est agricultural economies,5 and the disappearance of groundwater in
this region could harm not just California, but the rest of the country
as well.6 Therefore it is imperative that the Central Valley implement
effective and efficient groundwater management plans immediately.
In recent history, California has seen various attempts at such reform
through legislative and judicial processes; however, due to landowner
resistance and a lack of general funds, these efforts have been far
from successful.7 Nevertheless, a number of local management enti-
ties throughout California have been able to limit their groundwater
use and dependence through a variety of innovative techniques.8 This
Comment thus suggests that in order to halt the impending ground-
water crisis, the Central Valley should look to some of these examples
for inspiration in developing and improving their own management
plans. Specifically, this Comment argues that Central Valley ground-
water management entities should implement management plans that
consider four important principles: (1) the collection and distribution
of information, (2) movement toward intrabasin collaboration, (3)
1. CAL. DEP’T OF WATER RES., CALIFORNIA’S GROUNDWATER—BULL. NO. 118, UPDATE
2003 2 (2003) [hereinafter BULLETIN 118], available at http://www.water.ca.gov/pubs/
groundwater/bulletin_118/california’s_groundwater__bulletin_118_-_update_2003_/bul-
letin118_entire.pdf.
2. See Eric L. Garner & Jill N. Willis, Right Back Where We Started From: The Last Twenty-
Five Years of Groundwater Law in California, 36 MCGEORGE L. REV. 413, 424 (2005).
3. See FRANK ACKERMAN & ELIZABETH A. STANTON, STOCKHOLM ENV’T INST., THE LAST
DROP: CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE SOUTHWEST WATER CRISIS 17 (2011). According to studies
conducted by NASA, sustained groundwater overdraft at its current rate could completely
exhaust the resource in California within the next 100 years. Id.
4. BULLETIN 118, supra note 1, at 29.
5. See generally infra notes 49–51.
6. See infra Part II.A.
7. See infra Part III.A–B.
8. This Comment focuses particularly on Rebecca Nelson’s working paper, Uncom-
mon Innovation: Developments in Groundwater Management Planning in California, which in-
cludes an excellent discussion and comprehensive list of the many innovative management
techniques being used by groundwater management entities throughout California. See
generally REBECCA NELSON, STANFORD WOODS INST. FOR THE ENV’T, UNCOMMON INNOVATION:
DEVELOPMENTS IN GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT PLANNING IN CALIFORNIA 1 (2011), available
at http://woods.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/files/UncommonInnovation.pdf.
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the development of recharge systems that utilize basin storage, and
(4) incentivizing a reduction in overall groundwater withdrawals. If
such steps are not taken, the continued use of ineffective or nonexis-
tent groundwater management plans in the Central Valley could lead
to economic and environmental disaster.
Part I will give a brief history of California groundwater law. Part
II will lay out the current problems in groundwater management in
the Central Valley and the probable effects of no reform. Part III will
discuss the available approaches to groundwater management and ul-
timately conclude that local management remains the best option.
Part IV will make a case for, and describe why, each of the four princi-
ples set forth above are so imperative in creating a successful ground-
water management plan.
I. History of Groundwater Law in California
A. The 1914 Water Code and the California Constitution
Until the early twentieth century, water law in California was
largely doctrinal.9 After years of debate and negotiation, the Califor-
nia legislature finally passed the state’s first comprehensive Water
Code in 1914.10 The code announced a whole system of rules and
regulations, but most significantly, it announced a limited jurisdic-
tion.11 California Water Code § 1201 states:
All water flowing in any natural channel, excepting so far as it has
been or is being applied to useful and beneficial purposes upon, or
in so far as it is or may be reasonably needed for useful and benefi-
cial purposes upon lands riparian thereto, or otherwise appropri-
ated, is hereby declared to be public water of the State and subject
to appropriation in accordance with the provisions of this code.12
This provision is important because it gives the State Water Re-
sources Control Board (“SWRCB”) jurisdiction over unappropriated
waters in flowing and natural channels.13 Notably, however, the scope
of this statute neglects percolating groundwater.14 Indeed, California
has yet to codify any sort of restriction on groundwater pumping be-
9. See generally Roderick E. Walston, California Water Law: Historical Origins to the Pre-
sent, 29 WHITTIER L. REV. 765, 766–67 (2008).
10. JOSEPH L. SAX, REVIEW OF THE LAWS ESTABLISHING THE SWRCB’S PERMITTING AU-
THORITY OVER APPROPRIATIONS OF GROUNDWATER CLASSIFIED AS SUBTERRANEAN STREAMS AND
THE SWRCB’S IMPLEMENTATION OF THOSE LAWS 26–39 (2002) [hereinafter SAX REPORT].
11. See generally CAL. WATER CODE § 1201 (West 2009).
12. Id. (emphasis added).
13. Id.
14. See SAX REPORT, supra note 10, at 5.
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yond the state constitution’s general provision that says “[t]he right to
water or to the use or flow of water in or from any natural stream or
water course in this State is and shall be limited to such water as shall
be reasonably required for the beneficial use to be served.”15 This pro-
vision, also known as the doctrine of “reasonable use,” applies to all
water in California, including groundwater.16 The reasonable use
rule, however, does nothing to prevent overdraft because it still allows
for the maximum utilization of groundwater, so long as it is put to a
reasonable use.17 Although this limit ensures fairness amongst users, it
still ultimately allows for the complete consumption of any given
aquifer.18
Interestingly, the very first drafts of California’s Water Code in-
cluded provisions that regulated the use of groundwater, and applied
a permitting system comparable to modern appropriation rules.19
Nonetheless, as the State Conservation Commission20 moved into
newer drafts, it began to treat groundwater differently, until the Com-
mission finally left it out altogether.21 The final description of waters
that would be regulated by the Water Code was narrowed to, “surface
water, and . . . subterranean streams flowing through known and defi-
nite channels.”22 While the term “subterranean flow” has grown to be
a source of debate and confusion in its own right, the general consen-
sus has been that this definition does not cover traditional ground-
water and therefore it is not subject to the Water Code. 23
B. Groundwater Common Law: The Correlative Rights Doctrine
Beyond the California Constitution, the only restriction placed
upon groundwater use comes from common law. In Katz v. Walkin-
shaw,24 the California Supreme Court adopted the correlative rights
15. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2.
16. See generally Eric L. Garner et. al., Institutional Reforms in California Groundwater
Law, 25 PAC. L.J. 1021, 1024 (1994).
17. See generally Walston, supra note 9, at 770–71.
18. An argument could be made that groundwater overdraft is an “unreasonable use”
under the California Constitution. Nevertheless, that theory has yet to gain much traction
in the real world, and is generally beyond the scope of this Comment.
19. See SAX REPORT, supra note 10, at 27.
20. The State Conservation Commission was appointed by the California legislature to
develop the Water Code. SAX REPORT, supra note 10, at 26.
21. Id. at 33–37.
22. Id. at 37.
23. See generally SAX REPORT, supra note 10, at 39.
24. 74 P. 755 (Cal. 1903).
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doctrine as the state’s system for groundwater regulation.25 The cor-
relative rights doctrine distinguishes between overlying users whose
property lies above a particular groundwater basin, and those appro-
priators who take water outside the basin to use on non-overlying
property.26 The latter group is considered “junior” to the overlying
landowners, and they only have a right to the groundwater when there
is a surplus.27 If there is a shortage of groundwater for the junior ap-
propriators, a standard appropriation system is applied, and those ap-
propriators who began pumping groundwater first in time are given
priority rights against the latter users.28 If there is not enough water to
meet the needs of the overlying users though, the appropriators lose
their rights altogether, and the remaining water is distributed propor-
tionally amongst the overlying users.29
To better understand this concept, consider the following exam-
ple. Farmer A lives above Big Basin and he uses the groundwater from
Big Basin to water his crops. Farmer B lives a few miles away in the
foothills, and his land does not overlie Big Basin. Therefore, to water
his crops, Farmer B utilizes a long distance pumping system to appro-
priate groundwater from Big Basin. Under this scenario, if Farmer A
uses 100% of the groundwater in Big Basin to water his crops each
year, Farmer B has no rights against Farmer A to continue his use of
the groundwater because he is the junior appropriator. However if
Farmer A only uses 75% of the groundwater in Big Basin each year,
and no other overlying landowner claims the other 25%, then Farmer
B has a right to that 25% of surplus groundwater to water his crops.
Now imagine that Rancher A moves in next door to Farmer A,
and Rancher B moves in next door to Farmer B. Like Farmer A,
Rancher A’s land overlies Big Basin; and like Farmer B, Rancher B’s
land does not overlie Big Basin, but he also begins long distance
pumping from Big Basin. If, on average, there is a surplus of ground-
water leftover from Farmer A and Rancher A’s uses, then Farmer B
gets to use all the groundwater he needs, and only then, if there is any
left over, does Rancher B get a share of the resource. This is because
for groundwater appropriators not overlying Big Basin, standard rules
25. See generally id.
26. David A. Sandino, California’s Groundwater Management Since the Governor’s Commis-
sion Review: The Consolidation of Local Control, 36 MCGEORGE L. REV. 471, 476 (2005).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 476–77.
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of appropriation apply.30 Therefore since Farmer B began his appro-
priation before Rancher B, Rancher B’s rights to the surplus water are
junior to those of Farmer B. Consequently, Farmer B gets to appropri-
ate his usual amount of groundwater, and only if there is any left can
Rancher B also acquire the resource.
However, in the event there is no surplus groundwater, both
Farmer B and Rancher B lose out on acquiring any groundwater that
year because their rights are still junior to those users physically over-
lying Big Basin. Now if between Farmer A and Rancher A there is still
not enough groundwater to satisfy their individual needs, then the
two must share the limited resource proportionally—according to the
amount of land they own overlying Big Basin. This means that unlike
Rancher B, it is of no consequence to Rancher A that he moved onto
his ranch after Farmer A. Rancher A still maintains an absolute right
to the groundwater beneath his land, subject only to limitation by the
rules of proportionality.31
Though complex, the correlative rights doctrine establishes a
rather bright line and predictable system for groundwater rights. The
problem that remains, however, as evidenced by the example, is that
determining who has a right to groundwater does nothing to preserve
the resource—it only informs us of who gets the last drop. Therefore,
despite the common law’s equitable allocation of groundwater, the
resource is still being quickly depleted without restriction.32
II. Unsustainable Overdraft in the Central Valley
Some may wonder whether the overdraft of California’s ground-
water is really such a big deal. The answer in short is yes, groundwater
overdraft is a very big deal. In fact the negative effects of the practice
are further amplified by the fact that the worst overdrafting is occur-
ring in the nation’s breadbasket—the Central Valley.33 By continuing
30. Simply put, prior appropriation adopts the idea of “‘first in time, first in right,’”
meaning that the first person to appropriate water from a given source has a senior right to
everyone else who begins appropriating from that same source after him. See generally JO-
SEPH L. SAX ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 124–26 (4th ed. 2006).
31. The author suggests that the reader draw out the example to best understand the
correlative rights doctrine.
32. SAX, supra note 30, at 404–05.
33. According to the United States Geological Survey (“USGS”), “More than 250 dif-
ferent crops are grown in the Central Valley, with an estimated value of $17 billion per
year.” CLAUDIA C. FAUNT ET AL., U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, FACT SHEET 2009–3057, CALIFOR-
NIA’S CENTRAL VALLEY GROUNDWATER STUDY 1 (2009), available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/
2009/3057/pdf/fs20093057.pdf.
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these current unsustainable trends, overdraft in the Central Valley
risks not only the complete loss of groundwater, but also detrimental
impacts to the nation’s food supply.34 Furthermore, once the land is
literally pumped dry, the ability to refill these underground aquifers is
made almost impossible by the naturally resulting phenomenon called
“subsidence.”35 These threats face the Central Valley.
A. Overdraft
According to the Department of Water Resources (“DWR”),
groundwater overdraft is defined as follows:
Overdraft is the condition of a groundwater basin in which the
amount of water withdrawn by pumping over the long term ex-
ceeds the amount of water that recharges the basin. Overdraft is
characterized by groundwater levels that decline over a period of
years and never fully recover, even in wet years.36
Simply put, overdraft is the unsustainable use of groundwater.
The weight of this concept is not apparent though until it is placed in
the context of current groundwater consumption.
In 2000, the United States Geological Survey (“USGS”) released a
study that estimated that 408,000 million gallons of water are with-
drawn in America every day.37 The study further estimated that of that
amount, California withdraws 51,200 million gallons—totaling ap-
proximately one-eighth of the nation’s average withdrawal.38 The
USGS then broke down the sources of withdrawal and determined
that of California’s daily use, 15,400 million gallons come from
groundwater.39 Thus, according to this data, California’s average
groundwater consumption accounts for approximately one-third of
the state’s total water withdrawal.
DWR is largely in accord with these findings, but has further dis-
covered that in dry years, the state uses closer to 40% groundwater to
satisfy demand, and even as much as 60% in certain regions.40 What
makes this data problematic though is the rate of overdraft that these
trends are precipitating.
34. See infra Part II.A.
35. See infra Part II.B.
36. BULLETIN 118, supra note 1, at 29.
37. SUSAN S. HUTSON ET AL., U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, CIRCULAR NO. 1268, ESTIMATED
USE OF WATER IN THE UNITED STATES IN 2000, at 4 (2004).
38. Id. at 6.
39. Id.
40. BULLETIN 118, supra note 1, at 24.
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As it stands, California has no comprehensive groundwater moni-
toring network, and therefore must rely on inexact estimates of over-
draft.41 Nonetheless, DWR estimates that California is currently
overdrafting its groundwater supply by approximately 1.5 million acre-
feet42 per year.43 The National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(“NASA”), on the other hand, has produced an even starker estimate,
finding that groundwater overdraft in California may be closer to 4.4
million acre-feet per year.44 Accepting NASA’s predictions as true, this
would mean that groundwater in the state will be completely ex-
hausted within 100 years.45
These numbers, however, only reflect current groundwater use.
The population in the Central Valley alone is anticipated to increase
from 3.8 million people in 2009 to six million people by 2020;46 and
California generally is anticipated to grow from thirty-eight million
people47 to forty-six million people by 2020.48 This growth in popula-
tion means that the amount of groundwater withdrawn in a year will
likely grow just as rapidly, hastening the pace of our current overdraft
trends. Therefore, without reform, it is only a short matter of time
before the aquifers underlying the state are pumped dry.
Although these facts on their own are troubling enough, the sub-
sequent effects of running out of groundwater in the Central Valley
intensify the issue. California is the largest agriculture-producing state
in the nation, and it accounts for 11% of the country’s total agricul-
tural value.49 The majority of this production comes from the Central
Valley, which generates an estimated $17 billion of crop value every
year.50 Indeed, one report has stated that approximately 25% of the
nation’s table food comes from just 1% of the country’s farmland—all
located in the Central Valley.51 These facts demonstrate that Central
Valley agriculture is critically important to not only the state, but to
41. Id. at 28.
42. One acre-foot is equivalent to the amount of water it would take to cover one acre
of land at a depth of 12 inches. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 25 (6th ed. 1990).
43. ACKERMAN & STANTON, supra note 3, at 16.
44. Id. at 16–17.
45. Id. at 17.
46. FAUNT, supra note 33.
47. State & County QuickFacts: California, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Mar. 14, 2013), http://
quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/06000.html.
48. BULLETIN 118, supra note 1, at 28.
49. See DEVIN GALLOWAY ET AL., U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, CIRCULAR NO. 1181, LAND
SUBSIDENCE IN THE UNITED STATES 23 (2005), available at http://water.usgs.gov/pubs//
circ/circ1182.
50. FAUNT, supra note 33.
51. GALLOWAY, supra note 49, at 23.
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the rest of the country too. Though running out of groundwater does
not automatically mean farmers won’t be able to grow food, it abso-
lutely means that food prices will be driven up as farmers are forced to
look to other, more expensive sources for water.
B. Subsidence
“Subsidence” is the decline in the land’s elevation as a result of
groundwater overdraft.52 It can cause not only physical surface dam-
age, but also destroy the aquifer’s ability to recharge, meaning that it
will no longer be capable of storing water.53 When overdraft occurs,
the water table lowers constantly. As the water table drops, the upper
part of the aquifer goes dry, and the tiny spaces between the particles
of dirt and sand that were once filled with water also go dry. Gravity
then collapses the above-lying dirt and sand into these now empty
spaces, resulting in subsidence.54
The immediate problem with subsidence is physical surface dam-
age. When the land’s elevation decreases, damage to infrastructure
can be devastating. Subsidence can directly submerge canals, bridges
and pipelines, as well as collapse well casings and disrupt irrigation
ditches.55 Indeed, the USGS has estimated that subsidence causes
nearly $180 million in damage in the Central Valley each year.56 This
amount of damage is unsurprising when one considers the fact that
more than 5,200 square miles of the Central Valley have already col-
lapsed over a foot due to subsidence.57 In some areas, subsidence has
caused the ground to fall much more than one foot. In the town of
Mendota, subsidence has caused the ground level to fall approxi-
mately twenty-eight feet since 1925.58
Perhaps even more serious, however, is not the damage subsi-
dence causes above ground, but the damage it causes below the sur-
face. Subsidence can cause an aquifer to permanently lose its ability to
recharge.59 Therefore once all of the groundwater is withdrawn from
a particular aquifer, not only is the resource eliminated, but it also
becomes totally irreplaceable.60 Past estimates of California’s total
52. SAX, supra note 30, at 405.
53. Id. at 405–06.
54. Id.
55. See GALLOWAY, supra note 49, at 34.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 23.
58. Id.
59. SAX, supra note 30, at 406.
60. This is effectively groundwater “mining.” See SAX, supra note 30, at 406.
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groundwater storage capacity have ranged from 850 million acre-feet
to 1.3 billion acre-feet.61 Though these numbers largely have been
predicated on incomplete data, the point is still evident: Without the
storage capacity of these underground aquifers, California could po-
tentially be unable to store enough water to consistently meet its
demands.62
III. Common Approaches to Groundwater Management
Given the tremendous devastation that would result from the
continued neglect of effective groundwater management, the next
question is which approach to dealing with overdraft is most effective?
Though there are a variety of management strategies, all can be cate-
gorized into three major approaches: (1) state management, (2) judi-
cial allocation, and (3) local management.63 While there are benefits
and pitfalls to each approach, the best chance of success still lies with
the system that has always prevailed in California—local
management.64
A. State Management
As discussed previously, in initial drafts of the California Water
Code, groundwater was to be regulated the same way as surface
water—through prior appropriation and permitting.65 The proposal
was eventually abandoned however, and since then there has been no
statewide control of groundwater withdrawal or use.66
Nonetheless, a number of people have argued for a statewide
management system to fix California’s overdraft problems. One au-
thor has commented, “[t]o ensure all water needs in California are
considered, local piecemeal regulations must be eliminated . . . . The
California legislature must adopt statewide regulations of ground-
water to protect this dwindling resource and ensure uniform regula-
tions apply to all, now and in the future.”67 Statewide regulation is not
a novel approach. Many western states surrounding California have
61. BULLETIN 118, supra note 1, at 93.
62. The problem with not being able to store water underground is discussed infra
Part IV.C.
63. SAX, supra note 30, at 518.
64. See generally GOVERNOR’S COMM’N TO REVIEW CAL. WATER RIGHTS LAW, FINAL RE-
PORT 166–67 (1978) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT].
65. See supra note 19.
66. Id.
67. Gayle Rousey, Groundwater: Uniform Control of a Critical and Limited Resource, 15 SAN
JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REV. 169, 191–92 (2006). See generally Garner, supra note 16.
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adopted the prior appropriation system, leaving groundwater manage-
ment and permitting almost entirely under state control.68 The bene-
fits of such a system are clear. The uniform treatment of the resource
allows for groundwater rights to be easily determined and allocated.
Furthermore, state control ensures that conflicts between ground-
water users won’t arise as often, and that groundwater management is
being implemented throughout every part of the state.69
Despite these benefits, the need for flexibility in groundwater
control in California remains a priority. Nearly thirty-five years ago,
“The Governor’s Commission to Review California Water Rights Final
Report”70 (“Final Report”) explained that “California’s experience
with groundwater management . . . differs from that of other western
states.”71 The Final Report expressed that statewide regulation of
groundwater is impractical “[b]ecause of the various levels and types
of existing management programs and substantial differences in
groundwater basin conditions and needs in the State.” For these rea-
sons, the Final Report conveyed a preference for local management,
opposed to statewide rule.72 Though bright-line rules and blanket reg-
ulations are often appealing, the oversimplification of the state’s hy-
drology system and water needs could be detrimental to its citizens. As
recognized by the Final Report, the broad spectrum of interests and
resource availability in California is better served by a collection of
local approaches, each of which can be tailored to address the
problems of each basin.73
At the same time, it is not just the impracticality of statewide
groundwater regulation that prevents such legislation. The fact is that
most groundwater users, many of whom are Central Valley farmers,
want to continue pumping groundwater freely and without govern-
ment oversight.74 The current mentality of many of those pumping
California’s groundwater is to either pump until they are sued, or
pump until the resource runs out—at which point they can either
68. See Ronald Kaiser & Frank F. Skillern, Deep Trouble: Options for Managing the Hidden
Threat of Aquifer Depletion in Texas, 32 TEX. TECH L. REV. 249, 267–68 (2001).
69. WILLIAM BLOMQUIST, DIVIDING THE WATERS: GOVERNING GROUNDWATER IN SOUTH-
ERN CALIFORNIA 6 (1992).
70. FINAL REPORT, supra note 64.
71. Id. at 166.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See Felicity Barringer, As Aquifers Fall, Calls to Regulate the Use of Groundwater Rise,
N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2009, at A16. One farmer, Mark Watte, was quoted as saying, “I don’t
want the government to come in and dictate to us, ‘This is all the water you can use on
your own land,’ . . . . We would resist that to our dying day.” Id.
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drill deeper or start using imported water.75 Regardless of which
mentality those pumping the water espouse, opponents and propo-
nents alike recognize that the battle for statewide groundwater legisla-
tion will be grueling76 and therefore will not gain legislative traction
anytime soon.
B. Court Adjudication
Another form of management that California has utilized occa-
sionally is court adjudication. Under California law,77 any ground-
water user may initiate an adjudication to determine the rights
between the various users within a particular basin.78 The courts will
order and review all relevant data to determine the amount of
groundwater each user may withdraw per year according to correlative
rights standards.79 Typically, the courts will then appoint a
watermaster to oversee the judgment and to ensure compliance.80
Most adjudicated basins have seen either a decrease in ground-
water extraction or, at least, no increase in extractions.81 Overall,
there have been approximately nineteen groundwater adjudications
in the state of California, and fifteen of these have limited ground-
water use for all of the parties involved.82 Indeed, there have been a
number of success stories in utilizing this process. The first basin-wide
adjudication in California occurred in the Raymond Basin in Pasadena
v. Alhambra.83 In that case, the California Supreme Court upheld the
district court’s ruling that in order to halt the current overdraft of the
Raymond Basin, all users would have to make pro rata reductions in
their annual withdrawal.84 As a result of this case, an effective manage-
ment program was established in the Raymond Basin, and the water
table has risen substantially.85
Another successful adjudication, also in southern California,
came out of the San Gabriel Basin judgment.86 In that case, the out-
75. See Garner, supra note 16, at 1022; Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Tragically Difficult:
The Obstacles to Governing the Commons, 30 ENVTL. L. 241, 249–52 (2000).
76. Barringer, supra note 74.
77. See generally CAL. WATER CODE §§ 2000–2001, 2100 (West 2012).
78. SAX, supra note 30, at 444; see also BULLETIN 118, supra note 1, at 40.
79. BULLETIN 118, supra note 1, at 40.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. 207 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1949).
84. Id. at 35.
85. BLOMQUIST, supra note 69, at 81, 85.
86. Id. at 172.
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come was a set of defined rights for 190 parties, the creation of a new
basin governance entity, and the development of a management sys-
tem tailored specifically to that basin.87 As William Blomquist put it,
“[t]he judgment [was] essentially a constitution for the main San
Gabriel Basin.”88
Although these stories appear encouraging, the adjudication pro-
cess remains extremely costly, time-consuming, and generally ineffi-
cient.89 For example, the Santa Maria adjudication, which is still being
appealed after twelve years of litigation, has already cost the parties
involved over $11 million.90 The longest adjudication in California
history lasted twenty-four years,91 and many others have taken any-
where between five and fifteen years to complete.92 Furthermore,
these adjudications often have very uncertain outcomes, are typically
appealed, and ultimately serve the interests of private parties as op-
posed to the public.93
Finally, adjudications are not always guaranteed to succeed. Bar-
stow v. Mojave Water Agency94 represents an infamous example of adju-
dication failure. In Barstow, after ten years of litigation, the California
Supreme Court overturned the district court’s final judgment because
it impermissibly ignored priority rights under the common law sys-
tem.95 Consequently, this is a prime example of the uncertainty of
adjudications and their potential inability to resolve overdraft
conflicts.
C. Local Management
The final groundwater management system available to Californi-
ans is the continued use of local management. California currently
authorizes more than twenty forms of local agencies to implement
some form of groundwater management system.96 The types of agen-
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See Garner, supra note 16, at 1044.
90. Groundwater Studies, SAN LUIS OBISPO CNTY., CAL., http://www.slocounty.ca.gov/
planning/commguidelines/PRgroundwater/groundwater_studies.htm (last visited May 7,
2013).
91. This was the San Fernando Valley Basin, lasting from 1955 until 1979. BULLETIN
118, supra note 1, at 42.
92. BULLETIN 118, supra note 1, at 42–43.
93. See generally Garner, supra note 16, at 1043–44.
94. 5 P.3d 853 (Cal. 2000).
95. Id. at 869 (holding that “the [physical] solution’s general purpose cannot simply
ignore the priority rights of the parties asserting them”).
96. BULLETIN 118, supra note 1, at 33.
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cies include everything from Metropolitan Water Districts to Irrigation
Districts, and they regulate groundwater use and distribution through
a variety of methods.97 Additionally, a growing number of cities and
counties have also begun to adopt local ordinances that regulate
groundwater use.98
The Orange County groundwater basin provides one of the most
famous examples of the successful implementation of local manage-
ment. At the height of the basin’s overdraft in the 1930s, pumpers in
Orange County were extracting in excess of 200,000 acre-feet of
groundwater a year.99 This practice caused the water table to drop
from 100 to twenty-three feet above sea level in only ten years.100 Not
only did such depletion threaten salinity intrusion and contamina-
tion,101 but it also created various cones of depression over the basin
and changed the direction of groundwater movement.102 However, in-
stead of responding to this problem through adjudication like many
of its neighboring basins, Orange County chose to approach the issue
differently.103
In 1933, the county established the Orange County Water District
(“OCWD”).104 The OCWD was charged with:
[M]anagement of the groundwater basin, conservation of the
quantity and quality of groundwater in the basin, reclamation of
water for beneficial use, and conservation and control of storm and
floodwaters flowing in the district. To sell, and store water; con-
serve or replenish water within or outside the district and protect
the water supply and water rights of Orange County users through
any action or proceeding.105
To accomplish these tasks, the OCWD implemented a number of
innovative and successful management techniques, including large-
97. Id. at 33–34.
98. Id. at 36.
99. BLOMQUIST, supra note 69, at 247.
100. Id.
101. Salinity intrusion and contamination occurs in coastal regions throughout the
world:
[It] is the induced flow of seawater into freshwater aquifers primarily caused by
groundwater development near the coast. Where groundwater is being pumped
from aquifers that are in hydraulic connection with the sea, induced gradients
may cause the migration of salt water from the sea toward a well, making the
freshwater well unusable.
Pump/Recharge Rate Affects Saltwater Intrusion, SOLINST, http://www.solinst.com/Res/pa-
pers/101C4Salt.html (last visited May 7, 2013).
102. Id.
103. See generally id. at 245.
104. Id. at 249.
105. Id.
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scale artificial basin replenishment and the installation of coastal bar-
riers.106 Its signature management tactic was the creation of a penal-
ties and rewards system by imposing a pumping tax.107 This “basin
equity assessment” essentially levies a tax on those who pump more
than their allotted percentage while reimbursing those who pump
less.108 As a result, the method does not limit the amount of ground-
water an individual may extract, but imposes extra taxes on those who
use more than their fair share in order to offset the costs of water
importation.109 These management systems allowed OCWD to suc-
cessfully rescue the Orange County basin from critical overdraft.110
In a recent report authored by Rebecca Nelson,111 she explores
over fifty other successful groundwater management techniques used
throughout California, highlighting the aspects of each that are par-
ticularly promising.112 For example, she notes that in some areas, not
only are the individual stakeholders collaborating to gather informa-
tion and develop management plans, but entire water districts are
teaming up to address and fix their shared overdraft problems.113 Nel-
son also describes examples of districts that have implemented permit-
ting systems, large recharge projects, and water banking.114 The
report details a comprehensive list of local efforts at all stages of
groundwater management and illustrates the fact that local manage-
ment continues to improve and evolve to meet California’s
demands.115
Despite their many successes, some still criticize local manage-
ment systems. Critics most vocally complain that although local con-
trol has long been the dominant form of groundwater management in
California, it simply has not worked.116 These critics attribute this fail-
ure to a number of factors, but mainly cite the inconsistent regula-
tions within basins, the insufficient funds and power to properly
manage the resource, and the lack of uniform goals among the vari-
ous regions as most problematic.117 Because of these setbacks, many
106. See generally BLOMQUIST, supra note 69, at 264–65.
107. Id. at 266.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 269.
111. Nelson, supra note 8.
112. Id. at iv.
113. Id. at 17–18.
114. Id. at 23, 28.
115. Id. at 33.
116. See generally Rousey, supra note 67.
117. See Garner, supra note 16, at 1250–51.
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people believe that local management will never be able to solve Cali-
fornia’s problems with overdraft and that the state therefore must take
control of groundwater management.118
Nevertheless, these critics ignore Nelson’s main point: Local enti-
ties in every California basin are capable of meeting the challenges to
effective local management through modern developments in basin
monitoring, intrabasin collaboration, recharge and storage facilities,
and incentive programs.119 Despite the support for statewide regula-
tion, local management remains the most promising method for man-
aging Central Valley groundwater. Indeed, the Final Report’s
recognition thirty-five years ago still holds true today: “The success of
local management programs shows that locally conceived and con-
trolled groundwater management programs can be adequate and that
state-level management is neither essential nor necessarily desirable
where effective local programs are undertaken.”120
IV. The Central Valley Solution: Utilizing Local Management
First, it is important to note that this Comment does not purport
to develop a blanket solution for all groundwater basins in the Central
Valley. Indeed, proper local management ultimately aims to adopt the
appropriate measures and regulations that are tailored to serve the
unique needs of each basin, rather than to develop one master
plan.121 Nevertheless, this Comment proposes that, on a basic level,
each local management entity must consider and implement the fol-
lowing four principles of groundwater management to create and
maintain a successful system: (1) collect and distribute groundwater
information; (2) make efforts toward intrabasin collaboration; (3) de-
velop recharge systems that utilize basin storage; and (4) incentivize a
reduction in overall groundwater withdrawals. Specifically addressing
each of these concepts in their management plans will aid local
groundwater agencies to eventually lead the Central Valley out of its
current critical overdraft.
A. Collect and Distribute Information
The first step in dealing with any problem is to understand what
you are up against. California currently lacks a comprehensive
118. Id.; see also Rousey, supra note 67, at 191–92.
119. See infra Part IV.
120. FINAL REPORT, supra note 64, at 146.
121. See generally BLOMQUIST, supra note 69, at 24.
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groundwater monitoring system,122 and therefore the state generally
does not know the actual condition of many of its underground ba-
sins.123 This is due not only to the expense of acquiring such data, but
also because many local management districts have chosen not to de-
velop such information.124
Comprehensive data is paramount to the success of adequate
groundwater management in the Central Valley. As DWR has pointed
out, “[s]ound groundwater management decisions require observa-
tion of trends in groundwater levels and groundwater quality.”125
Without such information, management decisions can only be based
on hypotheses at best—which is a practice too speculative to create
any sort of meaningful recovery of groundwater levels.126 Further-
more, the answer to one groundwater basin’s problems may not be an
effective solution in another basin due to the unique, physical differ-
ences between aquifers.127 Thus acquiring data specific to each basin
is necessary to develop adequate management plans throughout the
Central Valley.
Another important aspect in acquiring groundwater data is the
subsequent distribution of the findings, because those who do not
know they have a problem will not do anything to fix it. Nonetheless,
several areas of the state that are currently in overdraft possess basin-
specific data and have yet to enact comprehensive reform efforts.128
As the move toward stricter groundwater controls strengthens, Josh
Patashnik points out that the need for specific overdraft data will be-
come more important.129 In Patashnik’s opinion, as groundwater
overdraft affects more and more people, they will resort either to po-
litical organizing or to litigation; either way, the existence of precise
data that shows concrete harm will be critical to the success of their
122. BULLETIN 118, supra note 1, at 28.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 30. DWR further explains that while the use of “wells of opportunity” have
proven helpful, the state ultimately cannot rely on these borrowed wells to gather long-
term, consistent data. Id. at 29.
126. BULLETIN 118 gives the example of how limited data of groundwater quality does
not adequately address the sustainability of public use, but instead only provides a snapshot
of the current trends. Id. at 30.
127. See BLOMQUIST, supra note 69, at 24.
128. As Josh Patashnik points out, “[i]t is true, as critics contend, that better informa-
tion is not a panacea. Some areas of the state that have failed to prevent overdraft know
and publicize in great detail the degree to which their groundwater resources are being
depleted.” Josh Patashnik, All Groundwater Is Local: California’s New Groundwater Monitoring
Law, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 317, 326 (2011).
129. Id. at 327.
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reform efforts.130 Thus, better information is not just a tool for im-
proving existing management plans, but also a tool for the public to
better assert their rights and protect their interests.
California has long recognized the need for better groundwater
data, but only recently has done something about it. In 2009, Gover-
nor Schwarzenegger signed into law S.B.X.7 6131—a controversial bill
that required state or local agencies to monitor all groundwater basins
by 2010.132 While groundwater users and environmentalists alike criti-
cized the bill,133 it ultimately struck an important and thoughtful bal-
ance between state and local regulation.134 By requiring local agencies
to monitor their basins, S.B.X.7 6 utilizes statewide legislation in a way
that encourages local management control.135 The result is a locally
maintained monitoring system that has the support and enforcement
capabilities of the state.
Though still a relatively new law, S.B.X.7 6 has already enjoyed
some success. To comply with the statute’s requirements, DWR has
created the California Statewide Groundwater Elevation Monitoring
(“CASGEM”) program, which allows for local monitoring entities to
submit the data they collect to a single, publicly available, online
database.136 The ultimate goal of CASGEM is to collect and monitor
groundwater elevations in all of California’s 515 basins so that sea-
sonal and long-term groundwater trends can be identified, analyzed,
and used to implement effective management plans.137 Unfortunately,
the major obstacle that continues to threaten CASGEM’s success is
funding.138 When passing S.B.X.7 6, the legislature neglected to allo-
cate money for CASGEM. Consequently, the funds that DWR has been
using to pay for the program will be exhausted by 2014.139 To ensure
that this data continues to be collected and distributed, it is crucial
that the legislature direct the necessary funds to CASGEM immedi-
ately. The success of this program—and the success of S.B.X.7 6—
depends on it.
130. Id.
131. S.B.X.7 6, 2009–2010 7th Extraordinary Sess. (Cal. 2009), available at http://www.
leginfo.ca.gov/pub/09-10/bill/sen/sb_0001-0050/sbx7_6_bill_20091106_chaptered.pdf.
132. Patashnik, supra note 128, at 317–18.
133. Id. at 323.
134. See generally Patashnik, supra note 128.
135. Id. at 322–33.
136. DEP’T OF WATER RESOURCES, CALIFORNIA STATEWIDE GROUNDWATER ELEVATION
MONITORING (CASGEM) STATUS REPORT 1 (2012).
137. Id. at 4–5, 7.
138. Id. at 2.
139. Id.
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B. Moving Toward Intrabasin Collaboration
Another important concept for every local management district
to consider—though possibly the most difficult to achieve—is in-
trabasin collaboration. In general, there are typically multiple water
districts located above any single groundwater aquifer,140 and yet
these districts rarely collaborate to address overdraft.141 This may be
attributed to a number of factors, including disproportionate funding
between management entities and distrust between districts,142 but
the effect is always the same: A single aquifer gets subjected to a vari-
ety of management plans,143 and inevitably the basin suffers. It is easy
to imagine the problems that arise from this practice. If even one dis-
trict overlying a particular basin decides not to restrict groundwater
use, the neighboring districts will all feel the effects of that district’s
continued overdraft, despite their own attempts at developing effec-
tive management plans. Therefore the importance of intrabasin col-
laboration cannot be stressed enough.
There are numerous ways in which water districts may cooperate
with one another to address their shared problems. In her report, Nel-
son gives some examples of successful collaborations already taking
place in California.144 For instance, in 2001, a group of fifteen water
districts came together in the San Joaquin Valley to identify and assess
favorable areas for groundwater recharge.145 A similar joint effort pro-
duced a Standard Operating Procedure for groundwater data collec-
tion that fourteen water districts in the Sacramento area universally
adopted.146 However, the possibilities for intrabasin collaboration ex-
tend far beyond mere data collection and assessment. Water districts
overlying the same aquifer could enter into agreements that set pro-
portional limits on groundwater extraction throughout the basin.
They could also create universal permitting and monitoring systems,
and even develop an intrabasin water market, allowing certain districts
to buy and sell water credits when there are excesses and shortages.
The possibilities for intrabasin collaboration are endless, and they cre-
ate a potential for much more successful management plans.
140. See Garner & Willis, supra note 2, at 426.
141. See SAX, supra note 30, at 519.
142. Nelson, supra note 8, at 17.
143. SAX, supra note 30, at 519.
144. Nelson, supra note 8, at 17.
145. Id.
146. See id.
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Nelson lists many of the benefits that can result from intrabasin
collaboration: “[C]ooperation can save agencies time and money by
reducing duplication in management efforts, taking advantage of
economies of scale when contracting for similar goods and services,
and avoiding inadvertently counterproductive management measures
being taken by neighbors that are unaware of each other’s actions.”147
These benefits illustrate that by developing plans that contemplate en-
tire aquifers as well as all of the overlying districts, local management
can be more economic and more effective in addressing their shared
issues.
Intrabasin collaboration, however, does not just apply to local
management districts. The collaboration of stakeholder groups is also
a key aspect of this principle consideration. Diverse interests often
span any single groundwater basin, and thus the path of least resis-
tance is to consider all of these interests when developing ground-
water management plans.148 Though it can be a slow process to create
a plan that is mutually approved by farmers, cities, and all other inter-
est groups alike, the benefit of such collaboration is a management
plan that is less likely to suffer from intrabasin and interbasin con-
flict.149 Additionally, input from these various stakeholders can bring
different perspectives that will help meet a variety of management
planning objectives.150 Overall, the benefits of intrabasin collabora-
tion are too important to be ignored when developing a comprehen-
sive groundwater management plan.
C. Creating Recharge Basins That Utilize Underground Storage
The third action that all local management entities should con-
sider is making use of the massive storage capacities of their under-
ground aquifers. Most aquifers recharge naturally, though often at
varying rates.151 As was explained previously though, overdraft occurs
when pumpers extract more groundwater than the aquifer can natu-
rally recharge in a year.152 Thus, as was demonstrated by OCWD, it is
often necessary to not just reduce groundwater use, but also to affirm-
atively refill the aquifers.153 Artificial recharge is perhaps one of the
147. Id.
148. See id.
149. Nelson, supra note 8, at 17.
150. Id.
151. SAX, supra note 30, at 406.
152. See supra Part II.A.
153. One aspect of OCWD’s overall success has been its maximization of its aquifer
recharge capacity. By purchasing and using approximately 3,400 acres of land for
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most effective and immediate methods in restoring overdrafted aqui-
fers. In general, two techniques accomplish the recharge: (1) spread-
ing water over particularly absorbent lands (often called “recharge
basins”) or (2) injecting water into the ground through wells.154 Al-
though there is some risk of contamination in using these
processes,155 these risks are outweighed by the immediate recharge of
the Central Valley’s underground basins, which will stop land subsi-
dence and will save money that would otherwise be spent on drilling
and pumping from deeper wells.156 Artificial recharge may also help
prevent the permanent destruction of these aquifers as storage
devices.157
The OCWD is a glowing example of just how successful and use-
ful groundwater recharge can be. As William Blomquist points out,
“the Orange County groundwater basin has been used not only as a
local water source, but also as a storage and distribution facility.”158
Indeed, part of OCWD’s unique success has been that instead of fo-
cusing on curtailing demand, the district has alternatively emphasized
improving supply.159 In general, the amount of imported water
needed to refill the Orange County groundwater basin may not be
available for every basin in the Central Valley, but the message is still
clear: Natural recharge is too slow to remedy the damage already
caused by overdraft, and therefore artificial recharge should be imple-
mented to some degree.
Interestingly, climate change may also impact the need for using
underground aquifers as water storage facilities. In their report enti-
tled “The Last Drop: Climate Change and the Southwest Water Crisis,”
the Stockholm Environment Institute explains a crucial effect of cli-
mate change in California:
California’s water supply is critically dependent on the extent of
snowpack and timing of snowmelt in the Sierra Nevada. Total an-
nual precipitation in the state may remain roughly unchanged as
the climate continues to change–but warmer winter temperatures
will cause earlier snowmelt, and will transform some winter precipi-
tation from snow to rain. This will shift streamflow toward the win-
recharge, OCWD has been able to artificially recharge up to 200,000 acre-feet of water a
year back into its aquifers. BLOMQUIST, supra note 69, at 264–65.
154. SAX, supra note 30, at 407.
155. See id.
156. See generally supra Part II.
157. See supra Part II.B.
158. BLOMQUIST, supra note 69, at 245.
159. Id. at 267.
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ter and spring months, moving peak water flows earlier by as much
as a month.160
Theoretically then, due to the lack of water storage reservoirs in
the state, early water will pass through California to the ocean as run-
off—reducing the total amount of water available for annual use.161
This, however, does not need to be the case. As stated previously, Cali-
fornia’s underground aquifers have the potential to store much, if not
all, of the state’s excess water,162 and could therefore completely com-
pensate for the reduction in snowpack. By storing this early Sierra Ne-
vada runoff in their underground basins, Central Valley management
facilities can not only recharge their largely depleted groundwater
supplies, but also save extra water for use later in the year. Thus, by
utilizing these aquifers, adequate water storage may never have to be
an issue in the Central Valley.
D. Incentivize Reductions in Groundwater Use
The final principle that every management plan must consider is
how to incentivize a mass reduction in groundwater use. Though one
would think that the threat of running out of groundwater should be
sufficient to encourage users to reduce the amount they withdraw, lo-
cal management entities should not rely on this threat alone. The
“tragedy of the commons” concept plainly exemplifies why knowledge
of the problem is not enough to stop people from using up the re-
source.163 By turning to incentive programs, management districts
may better assure that compliance is achieved.
160. ACKERMAN & STANTON, supra note 3, at 10.
161. See id.
162. See generally supra note 61.
163. See generally Thompson, supra note 75, at 249–54. Thompson explains the tragedy
of commons as follows:
When a resource is freely available to everyone in common, everyone has an in-
centive to take as much of that resource as they want, even though the collective
result may be the destruction of the resource itself. Society as a whole would be
better off restraining consumption and preserving the resource. But the rational
action for each individual is to consume to her heart’s content. Because no one
can bind anyone else’s actions, not consuming simply makes one a patsy. To each
individual, moreover, her own actions seem insignificant. Holding back will lead
to a marginal improvement, if any, in the condition of the resource. Even those
who recognize and bemoan the oncoming tragedy of overuse will often conclude
that it makes no sense not to join others in depleting the resource. The high road
leads nowhere. The cumulative result of reasonable individual choices is collec-
tive disaster.
Id. at 242.
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There are a number of options that management districts can
choose from when deciding how to incentivize reduced groundwater
dependence. One option is to establish a penalties and rewards system
similar to the one used by OCWD. As described previously, this system
allocates a proportional share of groundwater to everyone in the dis-
trict, and then taxes those who use more than their allotted amount
and compensates those who use less.164 Though there are a variety of
challenges to this approach,165 this system largely comports with basic
notions of fairness, and thus seems likely to have more success than
methods that arbitrarily benefit only certain users. Another option
water districts may consider is to introduce a permitting system much
like the appropriative system currently used for surface water extrac-
tion throughout the state.166 Mendocino City Community Services Dis-
trict, for instance, has already implemented such a system, which
requires that a person who plans “‘to extract groundwater for a new
development, change in use, expansion of existing use, or to construct
or modify a well’ [must] obtain a permit.”167
In her report, Nelson lists a number of other incentive programs
utilized in districts throughout the state that are also enjoying substan-
tial success.168 The overall purpose of these programs, however, is not
to punish those groundwater users taking more than their fair share
of the resource. The purpose of these incentives is to create a sense of
accountability amongst the public that will ultimately lead to a mutual
reduction in groundwater dependence. By employing such programs,
and increasing public compliance, water management entities will
have a much greater chance of success in implementing their plans.
Conclusion
California’s geography, economy, and food supply all depend on
the Central Valley, and yet current trends in groundwater overdraft
seriously threaten all three of these features. While there are a num-
ber of possible solutions to this impending crisis, improving local
management remains the most viable and promising approach.
164. See supra notes 107–10.
165. Determining the amount of groundwater that could be sustainably withdrawn in
any given year could prove difficult without proper monitoring equipment. Furthermore,
it is very likely that those who have never had to pay for groundwater would largely oppose
such a tax.
166. See generally CAL. WATER CODE § 1201 (West 2009); supra note 30.
167. Nelson, supra note 8, at 23.
168. See generally id. at 22–24.
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That is not to say, however, that there is no role for the state to
play in slowing down groundwater overdraft in the Central Valley. In-
deed, the California legislature has already begun to play a critical
role in slowing groundwater depletion by passing legislation such as
A.B. 3030 (granting local management authorities the power to create
groundwater management plans)169 and S.B.X.7 6 (mandating
groundwater monitoring statewide).170 What is significant about these
laws is not the control that they give the state, but the power that they
give to local management entities. By creating legislation that encour-
ages and empowers local management, California is able to maintain
flexible and yet tailored management systems that have the enforce-
ment and financial support of the state. Though most of the laws en-
acted thus far have been criticized for having little impact on
groundwater management, they are undoubtedly paving the way for
stronger legislation that will eventually give local districts the power
they need to be effective with their management plans.
But as has been argued throughout this Comment, the key to suc-
cess in reducing unsustainable groundwater dependence in the Cen-
tral Valley lies primarily at the local level. The four principles
discussed above should be thought of not as mere considerations for
groundwater districts, but should instead be labeled essential building
blocks for any operational management plan. The combination of
knowledge, collaboration, replenishment, and reduced dependence is
a recipe for success over the present conditions of the Central Valley’s
underground aquifers, and therefore should be employed in every
management plan. The most important thing at this juncture, how-
ever, is that we act before we get to the point of no return—before we
pump the last drop.
169. See A.B. 3030, 1991–1992 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1992) (codified as amended at CAL.
WATER CODE § 10750.6 (West Supp. 1993)).
170. S.B.X.7 6, 2009–2010 7th Extraordinary Sess. (Cal. 2009), available at http://www.
leginfo.ca.gov/pub/09-10/bill/sen/sb_0001-0050/sbx7_6_bill_20091106_chaptered.html.
